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I. Introduction
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... -1 In its Fourth Amendment juris-
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1995; B.S., University
of California, Berkeley, 1992.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
[893]
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prudence, the United States Supreme Court has developed a hierar-
chy of types of searches, each of which must be supported by a
different level of suspicion. At the top end of the hierarchy are
searches of the person, home, or personal effects that must be sup-
ported by a warrant and probable cause.2
At the opposite end, the Court has permitted searches without
any individualized suspicion.3 The searches in this category "deal
neither with [full-blown] searches nor with the sanctity of private
dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment
protection."4 Such searches may only be employed where the intru-
sion is minimal,' the danger sought to be avoided is of substantial and
demonstrable proportions,6 and it is demonstrated that the searches
are "sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforce-
ment practice under the Fourth Amendment."
'7
In between these two extremes, are searches permitted only on a
showing of "reasonable grounds" or "reasonable suspicion." As the
Court has explained:
Although we usually require that a search be undertaken only
pursuant to a warrant (and thus supported by probable cause, as
the Constitution says warrants must be), we have permitted ex-
ceptions when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable." 8
In this category, the Court has permitted searches on less than
probable cause where the government has demonstrated a substantial
interest unrelated to law enforcement. One such interest observed by
the Court is the need to rehabilitate convicted felons through the pro-
bation system.9 However, while the United States Supreme Court has
placed probation searches in this middle category, in a recent opinion
2. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
3. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border stops); Michi-
gan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of custom
agents).
4. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
5. Id. at 562.
6. E.g. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (illegal immigration);
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (drunk driving fatalities).
7. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,660 (1979) (holding law enforcement practice of
randomly stopping motorists to check registration to be in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
8. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).
9. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). For others see, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709 (1987) (government employers may conduct work-related searches of employ-
ees' desks and offices on less than probable cause); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985) (school official may search students and their property on reasonable suspicion).
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the California Supreme Court seems to have shifted them to the far
end of the spectrum.
In its opinion in In re Tyrell J1, 10 the California Supreme Court
would effectively permit random, suspicionless searches of juveniles in
order to ferret out those juvenile probationers subject to search
clauses." This Comment will not focus on the search clause itself,
rather it will focus on the application of the search clause by the
searching entity. In the instant case, can the searching officer rely on
the search condition of probation if he is unaware of the condition at
the time of the search?
This Comment examines In re Tyrell J.12 Part I of this Comment
will set forth the factual and procedural history of Tyrell, Part II will
summarize the majority and dissenting opinions by the California
Supreme Court, and Part Il will provide a critical analysis of the
court's opinion. Finally, Part IV will conclude that the decision in
Tyrell is insupportable in fact and law.
H. Background
A. In re Tyrell J.: The Facts
While attending a high school football game with two compan-
ions, Tyrell, a minor, was searched by a Fresno police officer.' 3 The
officer believed Tyrell and his two companions were gang members
and approached them after noticing one of Tyrell's companions was
10. 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994).
11. This Comment will discuss both probation and parole. A short explanation of
each follows.
Probation is both a punishment and a grant of leniency. It is a form of criminal sanc-
tion imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty. GEORGE
G. KILLINGER ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 14
(1976); see also, 18 U.S.C. 3651. The defendant has the right to refuse probation and un-
dergo sentence if the defendant feels that the terms of probation are harsher than the
sentence imposed by law. People v. Caron, 171 Cal. Rptr. 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
Due to their status, probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled, but only conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
restrictions.
Parole is a period of conditional, supervised freedom imposed on all prisoners on their
release form prison. Parole provides a testing period for the reintegration of the prisoner
into society, In re Carabes 193 Cal. Rptr. 65, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), and benefits society
by reducing the costs of the correctional process. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477
(1972). Although a parolee is no longer confined in prison, a parolee's status during parole
requires and permits supervision and surveillance under restrictions that may not be im-
posed on the public.
The significance of these differences as it relates to the application of a search condi-
tion will the topic of this Comment.
12. 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994).
13. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522.
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wearing a "heavy, quilted coat" on a warm night.14 The officer first
approached Tyrell's companion, pulled up his coat, and observed a
knife. 5 The officer then instructed all three of the minors to walk to a
fence about 15 to 20 feet away.' 6 As Tyrell complied with the officer's
instructions, the officer noticed Tyrell make several adjustments in the
area of his crotch.17 The officer pat-searched Tyrell, including his
crotch area and "felt a soft object approximately three inches in diam-
eter and twelve inches long.., part [of which] protruded from the
minor's pants."'18 Although the officer did not believe the object was
a weapon, he retrieved what he believed to be a bag of marijuana.' 9
Unknown to the searching officer, Tyrell was subject to a search
condition as, part of his probation for misdemeanor battery.20 The
search condition required Tyrell to "[s]ubmit to a search of [his] per-
son and property, with or without a warrant, by any law enforcement
officer, probation officer or school official."'"
A petition was filed against Tyrell in juvenile court, alleging that
he possessed marijuana for the purpose of sale.22 Tyrell denied the
allegation and moved to suppress 23 the evidence of the marijuana.24
At the suppression hearing, the officer admitted he was unaware of
Tyrell's search condition at the time of the search.25 Tyrell testified
that his pants and belt had come undone, and that he had been trying
to refasten them when the officer approached.26 The juvenile court
referee denied the motion to suppress.27
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court.2 8 The
court reasoned, "the matter of fortuity that appellant was subject to a
juvenile probation search condition did not justify [a] search which







20. Id. at 521.
21. Id. at 521.
22. Id. at 522. Possession of marijuana for sale constitutes a violation of California
law. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY LODE § 11359 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995).
23. CAL. WELF. & IN sT. CODE § 700.1 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
24. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. lId The juvenile court concluded, as both In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991), and In re Binh L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), had
concluded, that a probationer who is subject to a search condition has effectively and com-
pletely waived any Fourth Amendment challenge to a search.
28. In re "lyrell J., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22 (1992). The Fifth District is to date the only
appellate court in California to have reached this conclusion.
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otherwise violated the Fourth Amendment."2 9 The People appealed
to the California Supreme Court, and their petition for review was
granted.30
B. The Majority Opinion
In a 5-2 decision,3 ' the California Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's decision that the marijuana was admissible at trial against
Tyrell.32 In so doing, the court resolved an issue that had previously
divided California Courts of Appeal. For example, the Fifth District
in In re Tyrell J. held that an officer must have advance knowledge of
a search condition of probation before conducting a search unsup-
ported by probable cause or a warrant.33 However, published opin-
ions issued from the First34 and Sixth3 5 Districts expressly rejected
that position.
The California Supreme Court divided its discussion of the lower
court's opinion of Tyrell into three components: United States
Supreme Court precedent on the issue of probation searches,36 the
applicability of consent under People v. Bravo,37 and a probationer's
reasonable expectation of privacy.
1. United States Supreme Court Precedent
The only United States Supreme Court case to address the consti-
tutionality of probation searches is Griffin v. Wisconsin.3 8 Griffin in-
volved an adult probationer subject to the following search condition:
"[A]ny probation officer [may] search [Griffin's] home without a war-
rant as long as [the probation officer's] supervisor approves and as
long as there are 'reasonable grounds' to believe the presence of con-
traband-including any item that the probationer cannot possess
29. Id. at 29.
30. Tyrell, 876 P.2d 519, 522.
31. Chief Justice Lucas, writing for the majority, was joined by Justices Arabian, Bax-
ter, George, and Strankman. Id. at 532. Justice Kennard was joined by Justice Mosk in
dissent. Id. at 538.
32. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 532.
33. In re Tyrell J., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
34. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
35. In re Binh L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
36. Since the passage of Proposition 8 and its amendment of Article I, section 28(d), of
the California Constitution, the exclusionary rule is not applied unless federally compelled.
In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985). Accordingly, because the California Constitution
would forbid the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for an unreasonable search and seizure
unless the federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court would
require that remedy, the California Supreme Court looked first to whether the high court
had spoken on the topic. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 522-23.
37. 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987).
38. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
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under the probation conditions."39
In response to a tip and in compliance with the provisions of the
search condition, probation officers searched Griffin's home without a
warrant and discovered a gun.40 The Court in a 5-4 decision41 upheld
the warrantless search of Griffin's home because it was carried out
pursuant to state administrative regulations42 which satisfied the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.43 While acknowl-
edging that a probationer's home is normally protected by the
Amendment's requirement that searches be "reasonable" 44 and un-
dertaken only pursuant to a warrant,45 the Court also recognized ex-
ceptions when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable.
46
The Court in Griffin observed that restrictions on probationers
serve two primary purposes. First, restrictions assure that the proba-
tioner serve a period of genuine rehabilitation by deterring the proba-
tioner from re-offending.47 The Court recognized that a warrant
requirement would reduce the deterrent effect of expeditious searches
because the "delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it
more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of
misconduct."'
These restrictions also provide the secondary purpose of protect-
ing the community from the probationer while the probationer is in
the community. The Griffin Court stressed that a probationer is not
an average citizen, but a person who has already been convicted of a
crime.49 Since there is a high rate of recidivism among probationers, 0
supervision of a probationer's activities through unannounced
searches and seizures by probation officers is one means of combating
39. Id. at 870-71.
40. Id at 871. The probation officers were aware of the fact that Griffin was subject to
a search condition of probation at the time of the search and attempted to contact Griffin's
own probation officer prior to effectuating the search. Id.
41. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor; Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens
dissented. Id. at 869.
42. See e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
43. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
46. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in judgment)).
47. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 875 (citing Joan Petersilia, Probation and Felony Offenders, 49 FED. PROBA-
tION 4, 9 (1985)).
Spring 1995] FOURTH AMENDMENT AND JUVENILE PROBATIONERS 899
their potential renewed threat to the community.
5'
Therefore, the Griffin Court held that it was reasonable to dis-
pense with the warrant requirement.5 2 The probable cause require-
ment also was held to unduly disrupt the probation system.
5 3
The majority in Tyrell reasoned that Griffin was inapplicable be-
cause: (1) in Griffin a state regulation mandated the search condition
whereas in Tyrell a judge imposed the condition; (2) Griffin's search
condition required supervisory approval prior to the search and
Tyrell's did not; (3) the search in Griffin was effectuated by a proba-
tion officer, not a police officer as in Tyrell; (4) Griffin required rea-
sonable cause to search and, under California law, Tyrell only required
that the search not be arbitrary or intended to harass; and, "[m]ore
important[ly]," (5) Griffin "involved a situation in which the proba-
tion officer was clearly aware of the []search condition," whereas the
police officer in Tyrell was not. 4
Based on these distinguishing factors, the majority in Tyrell rea-
soned that Griffin was not "directly on point," and did not control the
question before it. 5 In the absence of binding United States Supreme
Court authority on the issue, the majority was required to "fulfill [an]
independent constitutional obligation to interpret the federal
constitutional
2. The Relevance of Consent. People v. Bravo 6
The majority in Tyrell next considered the relevance of consent to
the issue before it and concluded: "[a]s does the United States
Supreme Court, we follow the rule that a warrantless search is consid-
ered unreasonable per se 'unless it is conducted pursuant to one of the
few, narrowly drawn exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a
warrant.' One recognized exception is consent. '5 7 The Tyrell majoit
relied People v. Bravo to guide its discussion on the issue of consent. 8
51. l at 875. Further, the Ninth Circuit has expanded Griffin from "home" searches
to permit searches of the probationer without either probable cause or a warrant. It is the
exercise of supervision to assure that restrictions are in fact observed that permits a "de-
gree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public
at large." Id. at 875.
52. Id. at 876-77.
53. Id at 878. But see Griffin, 483 U.S. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In ruling
that the home of a probationer may be searched by a probation officer without a warrant,
the Court today takes another step that diminishes the protection given by the Fourth
Amendment to the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."').
54. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 524.
55. Id at 524.
56. 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987).
57. l (quoting Bravo, 738 P.2d at 336).
58. Id. at 525.
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In Bravo, the court examined the validity of a search conducted
pursuant to a search condition 9 substantially similar to that imposed
on Tyrell.6 ° The Bravo court held that the search of a probationer's
home by officers with knowledge of the probationer's search condi-
tion was permissible without probable or even reasonable cause.61
The Bravo court reasoned that where a defendant had given valid
consent, the resulting search cannot violate the Fourth Amendment
unless it exceeded the scope of that consent.62 "Our interpretation of
the scope of appellant's consent in agreeing to the search condition of
his probation is consistent with the dual purpose of such a provision
'to deter further offenses by the probationer and to ascertain whether
he is complying with the terms of his probation."'
63
The Tyrell majority emphasized the distinction between adult and
juvenile probationers. 64 Juvenile probationers in California do not
consent to probation; probation is imposed on the juvenile.65 The
Tyrell majority reasoned that the "advance consent" present in Bravo
permitted the broad intrusion on the probationer's Fourth Amend-
ment rights.66 However, since that element is lacking with respect to
juvenile probationers, the Tyrell majority concluded that it could not
resolve the issue based on the consent rationale controlling in Bravo.67
3. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Unable to find an answer in Griffin or Bravo, the majority turned
to more generalized principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment.68
The majority explained that Tyrell, due to his search condition of
probation, lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his person
and possessions.69 Therefore, Tyrell's Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated.7° The majority relied on the United States Supreme
Court holding in California v. Ciraolo71 for this position.72 In Ciraolo,
59. The search condition read as follows: "[The probationer must] submit his person
and property to search or seizure at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement
officer with or without a warrant." Bravo, 336 P.2d at 336-37.
60. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 521.
61. Bravo, 336 P.2d at 342-43.
62. Id. at 338.
63. Id. at 342 (quoting People v. Mason, 488 P2d 630, 632 (Cal. 1971)).
64. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 527.
65. Id. at 526-27. See also In re Nathaniel Z., 232 Cal. Rptr. 378, (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
In re Wayne J., 159 Cal. Rptr. 106, (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
66. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 525.
67. Id. at 527.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 527-30.
70. Id. at 532.
71. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
72. Id.
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the Court articulated the following two-part inquiry: "first, has the in-
dividual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of
the challenged search? Second,is society willing to recognize that ex-
pectation as reasonable?"' '73
Under the first prong of the test, the individual must show an
"actual" manifestation of a subjective expectation of privacy.7 4 The
majority reasoned that because Tyrell did not openly display the bag
of marijuana, but, in fact, attempted to hide it when confronted by
police officers, he had manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy.
75
However, the result in Tyrell ultimately rested on the majority's
analysis of the second prong of the Ciraolo inquiry: whether or not
society could or should be willing to recognize Tyrell's interests in pri-
vacy as reasonable. To answer this question, the Tyrell majority
turned to two lower court opinions, In re Marcellus L. 76 and In re Binh
L. ,77 for guidance.78
In Marcellus, a juvenile subject to a search condition of probation
underwent a pat-search by a police officer, and the police officer dis-
covered cocaine.79 "Everyone, including th[e] court, agree[d] there
were no articulable facts justifying the patsearch."80 Marcellus moved
to suppress the evidence as the "fruit of an unreasonable search."'
The juvenile court denied the motion on the grounds that Marcellus
had given up his Fourth Amendment rights when he accepted proba-
tion.s2 The court noted that the "community [was] entitled to the ben-
efit of the fact that the minor had waived his right." 3 It would also
serve "an insufficiently useful purpose to deny the People the right to
use the evidence."'
73. Id. at 211 (citation omitted).
74. The Fifth District in Tyrell gave the following examples of what could constitute
this "actual" manifestation: "the suspect hides something instead of carrying it in the open,
conveys his message by telephone instead of shouting it from the street, or takes something
inside his house instead of leaving it out in his yard." 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22,25 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
75. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 527.
76. 279 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
77. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
78. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 528. The Fifth District in Tyrell was of the opinion that both
Marcellus and Binh were wrongly decided. In re '1yrell J., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 28-29.
79. Marcellus, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
80. Id. The juvenile court agreed that "the search absent the search clause is unconsti-
tutional." Id. at 902.
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Over a strong dissent,85 the First District affirmed the juvenile
court's holding.86 The Tyrell majority seized upon the reasoning em-
ployed by the First District in Marcellus, stating "'[w]hat is critical is
that the juvenile... has been admitted to probation upon a legitimate
search condition.., and has absolutely no reasonable expectation to
be free from the type of search here conducted."'7
In Binh,"8 the Sixth District Court of Appeal also employed a
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. Like the minor in
Marcellus, Binh was subject to a search condition of probation. 9
Binh, a passenger in a car, was ordered out of the vehicle and patted
down twice by an officer. The officer believed Binh to be "truant"
although school had not yet started that morning.90 The second pat
search yielded a loaded pistol from Binh's person.91 The appellate
court characterized this as "[a] police officer, acting in apparent good
faith but with neither probable cause nor knowledge of the preexisting
probation search condition, search[ing] the minor's person and [find-
ing] incriminating evidence."'  The appellate court upheld the search
and relied on the seminal two-part test set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in California v. Ciraolo.93 The Binh court found that
the officer's ignorance of the search condition was irrelevant. Because
the juvenile was subject to a valid [court imposed] search condition,
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy that the pistol he was
carrying could be hidden from police.94
The Tyrell majority agreed with the analysis of both Marcellus
and Binh.95 Since the juvenile in Tyrell was subject to a valid search
condition of probation, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.96
The majority observed that probationers have a reduced expectation
85. Id. at 908 (Reardon, J., dissenting). Justice Reardon stated in his dissent, "[tihis
holding takes us beyond Bravo, and represents an extension that is not only unsupported
by, but is inconsistent with, Bravo and Griffin v. Wisconsin relied on by the majority." Id.
(citations omitted).
86. Id. (Reardon, J., dissenting).
87. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 528 (quoting Marcellus, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 907) (emphasis
omitted).
88. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
89. Id. at 679. Binh's probation condition was imposed as a result of his involvement
in a car theft. Id.
90. Il at 680. The officer was unaware of the search condition. Id at 680-81.
91. Id. at 680.
92. Id. at 679.
93. 476 U.S. 207,211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,360 (1967) (
Harlan, J., concurring)). The inquiry contains the following two parts: first, has the individ-
ual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,
and second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Id.
94. Binh, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683-84.
95. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 528.
96. Id. at 530.
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of privacy, thereby rendering certain intrusions by governmental au-
thorities reasonable. 97
The majority bolstered this argument with two United States
Supreme Court cases it considered analogous: Hudson v. Palmer9" and
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association.9
In Hudson, an inmate was charged with the destruction of state
property when correctional officers uncovered a ripped pillow case in
his cell during a warrantless "shakedown."'" The Court rejected the
inmate's Fourth Amendment challenge to the search and stated:
[W]e hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate
any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have
in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply
within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy
rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be rec-
onciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and
objectives of penal institutions. 101
In Skinner, the Court upheld the constitutionality of blood and
urine tests for railroad workers after they had been involved in acci-
dents. °2 The Skinner Court reasoned that the participation of the
railroad workers in an industry that is the subject of pervasive regula-
tion due to the compelling governmental interest in safe railroads per-
mitted the intrusion on their Fourth Amendment rights.'3
The Tyrell majority found that Hudson and Skinner, like Tyrell
involved circumstances in which society was not prepared to recognize
an expectation of privacy."°
The majority added that the deterrent effect of the search condi-
tion would be eroded by the application of a strict knowledge first
requirement; "This important deterrent effect would be severely
eroded if police officers were required to learn the names and memo-
rize the faces of the dozens and perhaps hundreds of juvenile proba-
tioners in their jurisdiction.'
0 5
Further, the majority rejected Tyrell's arguments that a body of
parole search cases, which all require prior knowledge of a search con-
dition before executing a parole search, should bind the court in this
97. Id. at 528-30.
98. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
99. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
100. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 519.
101. ld, at 525-26.
102. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
103. Id. at 627.
104. 7yrell, 876 P.2d at 529. The majority admitted that the train wreck in Skinner and
the jail cell in Hudson were "extreme examples." Id.
105. Id. at 530.
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case.106 The majority ruled that these cases were distinguishable be-
cause they did not deal with the issues relating to the parolee's reason-
able expectation of privacy. 10 7
Finally, without detailed analysis, the majority concluded that
Tyrell's expectation of privacy was unreasonable because society was
unwilling to recognize it as legitimate. 08 Further, since the evidence
would not have been admissible absent the search condition, the ma-
jority concluded the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule remains
intact.
09
C. The Tyrell Dissent
Unlike the majority, the dissent believed Griffin was directly on
point.1 0 The dissent argued that the very facts the majority used to
distinguish Griffin from Tyrell actually required the exclusion of evi-
dence of drugs in Tyrell."' The dissent reasoned that in Griffin, the
"special needs" of the probation system permitted "impingement"
upon the probationer's Fourth Amendment rights." 2 Where those
"special needs" are absent, a search for purposes unrelated to further-
ing the goals of the probation system would be unconstitutional." 3
Therefore, if the officer was unaware of the minor's status as a proba-
tioner, the officer was not responding to the "special needs" of the
probation system and the search would be invalid.
14
Further, the dissent viewed the majority opinion as representing a
break with long settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." 5 No
other case had even intimated that a search might be permissible in
the absence of knowledge by the searching officer."
6
The dissent drew on two parole cases cited by the majority that
have prohibited reliance on a search condition of which the officer is
unaware, In re Martinez"7 and People v. Gallegos."' Although the
dissent recognized that Martinez and Gallegos both involved adult pa-
rolees and not probationers, it reasoned that for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, there are no significant differences between
106. Id The cases are In re Martinez, 463 P.2d 734 (Cal. 1970), and People v. Gallegos,
397 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1964).
107. Id. at 531.
108. Id. at 532.
109. Id. at 531-32.
110. Id at 532 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
111. Id at 533-34.
112. Id at 533.
113. Id
114. Id at 534.
115. Id
116. Id
117. 463 P.2d 734 (Cal. 1970).
118. 397 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1964).
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search conditions imposed on juvenile probationers and those im-
posed on adult parolees." 9
Therefore, because the court previously had required knowledge
of a search condition prior to searching a parolee, the dissent rea-
soned that the court should require the same "prior knowledge" with
relation to searches of juvenile probationers. 120
mII. Analysis
A. The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: an Analysis of the Court's
Reasoning in Tyrell
In In re Tyrell J.,121 the California Supreme Court quickly re-
vealed its position on Fourth Amendment protections for juvenile
probationers; basically, the court ruled that there are none. In a seem-
ingly result-oriented opinion, the court evinced both a disregard for
precedent and the Fourth Amendment. A clear reading of the court's
opinion in Tyrell reveals that the majority considered the search of
Tyrell reasonable. In scrambling to find a rationale for their resolu-
tion, the court had to distinguish unfavorable United States and Cali-
fornia Supreme Court precedent."'
1. United States Supreme Court Precedent: The Griffin Debacle
Despite the majority's urging otherwise, whether an officer must
have prior knowledge of a probationer's search condition is governed
by the only United States Supreme Court decision that addresses the
issue of probation search conditions, Griffin v. Wisconsin.'23
While Griffin upheld warrantless searches of a probationer, the
decision in Griffin was clearly driven by the relationship between the
probationer, the probation officer, and the "special needs" of the pro-
bation system.
The majority in Tyrell relied on the fact that none of the safe-
guards or special relationships present in Griffin were present in
Tyrell, and it concluded on this basis that Griffin was not "directly on
point."'124 However, a fair reading of the rationale in Griffin indicates
that the differences between the two factual situations should compel
a finding that the search of the minor in Tyrell was unconstitutional.1
25
119. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 536 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994).
122. Id. The cases are Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), In re Martinez, 463
P.2d 734 (Cal. 1970), and People v. Gallegos, 397 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1964).
123. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
124. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 524.
125. Id. at 533-34 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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The factors noted by the Tyrell court as distinguishing Griffin are
as follows: in Griffin a state regulation mandated the search condition,
supervisory approval was required prior to the search, the search was
effectuated by a probation officer, reasonable cause supported the
search decision, and, accordingly, the searching officer had knowledge
of the probation condition.126 In at least five separate statements in
its opinion, the Griffin Court emphasized that it was only because of
these factors that the search was permissible.
In fact, the Griffin Court expressly stated that the probation of-
ficer is not an ordinary police officer.127 The relationship between the
probation officer and the probationer is one that is not, or at least not
entirely, adversarial.128 Rather, in addition to protecting the public
interest, the probation officer has the welfare of the probationer in
mind.' 29 This, coupled with all of the other safeguards, made the in-
trusion upon the probationer's Fourth Amendment rights
permissible.
30
In distinguishing on these bases, the Tyrell majority disregarded
the strong intimation by the United States Supreme Court that the
result in Griffin would have been different if the search had been con-
ducted by a police officer and in the absence of the other safe-
guards.' 3' What Tyrell seems to represent is a weak attempt by the
majority to distinguish unfavorable, controlling authority.
That the majority in Tyrell seeks to ignore the applicability of
Griffin to the facts at hand is further evidence that the desired result
in Tyrell was driving the rationale. The Tyrell court's contention that
"there is ... no United States Supreme Court decision that directly
upholds the constitutionality of [the officer's] search of the minor in
this case," is accurate. 32 The Griffin reasoning would not uphold the
constitutionality of the search in this case; it would require instead
that the search be held unconstitutional and that the evidence be sup-
pressed. Therefore, the majority had to look elsewhere for support.
2. Bravo, Martinez, and Gallegos: the Applicability of Consent
In its discussion of the relevance of consent, the majority ad-
dressed and dismissed People v. Bravo,33 the lead California case on
probation searches. Later in its opinion, almost as an afterthought,
126. Id at 524.
127. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
128. Il at 879.
129. It at 876.
130. Id. (the safeguards include a requirement of reasonable suspicion, prior supervi-
sory approval, and effectuation of the search by a probation official, to name a few).
131. lId at 878-79.
132. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 524 (emphasis added).
133. 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987).
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the majority addressed People v. Gallegos'34 and In re Martinez,135
two parole cases that should properly be included in the majority's
discussion of consent. That the majority declined to deal with Gal-
legos and Martinez in their proper context is additional evidence of
the majority's result-oriented approach.
a. People v. Bravo
The majority dealt with Bravo in the same conclusory fashion
that it dealt with Griffin,
[b]ecause a minor has no choice whether or not to accept a con-
dition of probation that subjects him to a warrantless search, we
cannot find that he consented to the condition. Consequently, it
would be improper to resolve the issue in this case by simple
reliance on the "advance consent" rational in Bravo.
13 6
The only "impropriety" in the application of Bravo is that a fair read-
ing of Bravo would deny the majority their desired result.
137
The majority appropriately observed that adult probationers and
juvenile probationers are different under the "consent" rationale set
forth in Bravo.138 Because of the voluntary consent by the adult pro-
bationer to the search condition of probation, the adult probationer
can only complain if the search is conducted for harassment or in an
unreasonable manner.139 In Bravo, it is the acceptance of probation
by the adult probationer that constitutes "consent" and permits the
Fourth Amendment intrusion. 40 However, the Bravo court made it
clear that "searches of probationers may [not] be conducted for rea-
sons unrelated to the rehabilitative and reformative purposes of pro-
bation or other legitimate law enforcement purposes."'
4 '
The majority is correct that lyrell did not consent to probation
and, therefore, is not similarly situated to the adult probationer in
Bravo.142 The majority, however, completely ignores the discussion of
adult parolees in Bravo. Like juvenile probationers, adult parolees do
not "consent" to the imposition of parole; rather, it is imposed on
them. 143 And the court in Bravo made it unequivocally clear that
134. 397 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1964).
135. 463 P.2d 734 (Cal. 1970).
136. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 527, (citing Bravo, 738 P.2d at 336).
137. This is not to imply that the police should be able to validate illegal searches of
adult probationers. However, it is ironic that the juvenile, who in no way consents to the
imposition of probation, is provided less Fourth Amendment protection than the adult who
gives "broad" consent.
138. IM. at 527.
139. Bravo, 738 P.2d at 340.
140. Id.
141. Id at 342.
142. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 526-27.
143. Bravo, 738 P.2d at 341.
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"consent" was the key distinction between the adult probationer and
the adult parolee.'" It was the "consent" that made broad impinge-
ment on the rights of the adult probationer permissible and the ab-
sence of "consent" that provided the parolee with greater Fourth
Amendment protection.
The majority in Tyrell identifies no compelling reason to treat ju-
venile probationers differently than adult parolees.with respect to
their search conditions. However, if the majority were to recognize
this position as valid, they would have to concede that Martinez and
Gallegos control the question of whether in the juvenile context the
officer must have knowledge of the search condition prior to the
search.145
Thus, the Tyrell majority is unwilling to recognize the parallels
between the adult parolee and the juvenile probationer because under
Gallegos and Martinez, it is long settled in the parole context that the
officer must have knowledge of the search condition prior to the search.
b. People v. Gallegos
The majority in Tyrell differentiated Gallegos in the same dubious
fashion as it differentiated Griffin. The majority observed that the
searching officer in Tyrell was unaware of the search condition prior to
Tyrell's search, unlike the searching officer in Gallegos.'46 Based on
this distinction, the Tyrell court concluded that Gallegos is inapplica-
ble to the case at hand. 47 However, the majority overlooks that the
court in Gallegos did not state merely that knowledge was required,
but rather that knowledge was not enough. 48
The Gallegos court reasoned that even though the searching of-
ficer was aware of the search condition of parole at the time of the
search, because the officer was not acting pursuant to the authority
granted by the search condition, the subsequent search was invalid.'4 9
More specifically, since the officer was acting pursuant to his general
law enforcement duties and not for purposes related to Gallegos' pa-
role status, 50 the officer could not rely on the search condition of
which he was aware to validate an otherwise illegal search.' 5'
144. Bravo, 738 P.2d at 340-41.
145. See also People v. Gastelum, 46 Cal. Rptr. 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
146. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 531.
147. Id
148. Gallegos, 397 P.2d at 174-76.
149. 1l
150. As Griffin makes clear, in order to be subjected to a lesser standard of suspicion,
the search of the probationer must be for purposes related to the "special needs" of the
probation system. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
151. Gallegos, 397 P.2d at 174-76.
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The Tyrell majority seems somewhat perplexed by this holding.
Considering their misapplication of Griffin however, their discomfort
with Gallegos likely is genuine. In Gallegos, it was clear that the of-
ficer was not acting in any supervisory capacity, but rather, for general
law enforcement purposes.15 Therefore, the Gallegos court properly
reasoned, foreshadowing the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Griffin over twenty years later, that where no special needs are
present, impingement upon Gallegos' Fourth Amendment rights was
impermissible.
153
The majority's handling of Martinez also is unjustifiable. The
Martinez court was unequivocal in requiring knowledge by the police
officer prior to the search:
[R]egular police officers undertook the search pursuant to their
general law enforcement duties; the officers, at the time of the
search, did not even know of defendant's-parole status. The in-
vestigation involved suspected criminal activity, not parole vio-
lations. Under these circumstances the officers cannot
undertake a search without probable cause and then later seek
to justify their actions by relying on defendant's parole status, a
status of which they were unaware at the time of their search.
1 54
In its attempt to avoid the plain meaning of Martinez the majority
makes two assertions: (1) the language regarding the officer's knowl-
edge was not strictly necessary to the holding of the case;155 and (2)
even if it was necessary, the opinion did not discuss how Martinez
could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his house when he
knew he could be searched at any time.'56 Both of these assertions
are incorrect.
The language regarding the officer's knowledge was strictly nec-
essary to the holding of the case. The Martinez court specifically
stated that one of the issues to be decided was whether the "Adult
Authority, in exercising its broad authority over the parole system and
parolees, [could] properly consider evidence which has been obtained
by government officials ... as a result of an unconstitutional search
and seizure .... ,1s 7 Further, the court stated that it was required to
face the issue directly because "from the facts as related.., the police
authorities, in obtaining the extrinsic evidence.., did indeed violate





154. Martinez, 463 P.2d at 737.
155. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 530-31.
156. Id.
157. Martinez, 463 P.2d at 737.
158. Id.
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The second assertion by the majority, that the opinion does not
discuss how the parolee in Martinez could have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in light of his search condition,159 also is incorrect. The
Martinez court states: "[a]lthough past cases have sometimes declared
that a parolee is in 'constructive custody' ... [this] cannot change the
reality of a parolee's conditional freedom and cannot affect the consti-
tutional protections surrounding his interest in that conditional free-
dom."' 6 °  Accordingly, the court asserted that like other
administrative searches, searches by parole officers pursuant to their
duties are subject to the broad reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.' 6' The Martinez court went on to specifically ad-
dress the issue of the parolee's reasonable expectation of privacy.
The conditional nature of a parolee's freedom may result in
some diminution of his reasonable expectation of privacy .... A
diminution of Fourth Amendment protection, however, can be
justified only to the extent actually necessitated by the legiti-
mate demands of the operation of the parole process. When a
police officer is not aware that a suspect is on parole, or is not
investigating a parole violation, an intrusion into the parolee's
privacy cannot be properly justified by the needs of the parole
system.' 62
In fact, the Martinez court disapproved of a case' 63 that suggested that
a parolee is without any constitutional protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.' 4
Although Martinez and Gallegos were decided many years prior
to the United States Supreme Court decision in Griffin, it is clear that
they represent the seeds of the "special needs" argument articulated
in Griffin.
What is curious about the discussion by the Tyrell majority re-
garding Martinez and Gallegos is the fact that they are parole cases.
The majority could simply have observed this distinction-Tyrell is a
juvenile probationer and Gallegos and Martinez involve adult parol-
ees. The majority had observed similarly meaningless distinctions in
its differentiation of Griffin. However, as even this majority must
have recognized, and as the dissent correctly concluded, there are no
significant differences between juvenile probationers and adult parol-
ees for Fourth Amendment purposes. 65 Therefore, since the majority
could not find a means to distinguish between the juvenile proba-
159. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 531.
160. Martinez, 463 P.2d at 737-38 (citing Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 98 n.2 (6th Cir.
1968) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting)).
161. Id. at 738 n.6.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. People v. Goss, 14 Cal. Rptr. 569, 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
164. Martinez, 463 P.2d at 738 n.5.
165. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 536 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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tioner and the adult parolee, it instead trampled over twenty years of
California Supreme Court precedent to achieve the result it desired.
The majority simply acknowledges that juvenile probationers are not
similarly situated to adult probationers and proceeded with an analy-
sis of the probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy under Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo.
166
Why the Tyrell majority decided that it must reject a knowledge
first requirement despite the contrary authority is unknown. It seems
apparent, however, that the majority felt the search of Tyrell was rea-
sonable. Therefore, instead of looking first to case law for the answer,
the majority seems to have decided the answer first and worked back-
ward. From that perspective, it is not surprising that the majority had
to rely on Ciraolo to support its opinion. Ciraolo provides the most
subjective test and, thus, gives the court the most leeway in supporting
its conclusion. Even under Ciraolo, however, the court's analysis is
sparse.
While purporting to rely on Marcellus167 and Binh to show the
minor lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, the
majority never actually analyzed or applied the facts and reasoning
underlying Marcellus and Binh to the facts in Tyrell. Instead, the ma-
jority merely adopted the conclusion in these cases as the analysis for
its position.168 The majority never actually analyzed why Tyrell had
no reasonable expectation of privacy; it merely concluded that he did
not. The reasoning is circular-Tyrell's expectation of privacy is un-
reasonable because society is unwilling to recognize it as legitimate.
The majority's conclusion is not based on its belief that society would
not recognize as reasonable the privacy interests of juvenile proba-
tioners. Its perception of what society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable is not based on any empirical data; rather it merely reflects
the perception of the four Justices who joined the opinion of the Chief
Justice.
The majority's misplaced reliance on Hudson and Skinner as "ex-
amples" only reinforces the impression that the majority is searching
for a rationale to support its conclusion. The United States Supreme
Court made extensive findings in both Hudson and Skinner regarding
why society found the expectation of privacy unreasonable. The
thrust of Hudson was that society was not prepared to recognize a
prison cell as a place that cannot be invaded.169 The relationship be-
tween a person's expectation of privacy in a prison cell while incarcer-
166. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
167. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
168. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 528.
169. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527-28.
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ated and a person's expectation of privacy while out of custody
certainly is very weak.
Likewise, the decision in Skinner offers little support. In Skinner,
both the circumstances justifying the drug testing and the permissible
limits of such testing were defined narrowly and specifically in the
regulations that authorized them, and were likely known to covered
employees. 170  Further, minimal discretion was vested in those
charged with administering the program. 7'
Instead, the majority in Tyrell focused on the minor's unreasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the marijuana.72 However, it is the place
to be searched, not the item recovered, that must drive this inquiry.
One could only imagine what would remain of the Fourth Amend-
ment under a constitutional inquiry that provided otherwise. The in-
quiry is not whether society is prepared to recognize the possession of
marijuana as legitimate, but rather, whether the Tyrell's crotch should
be afforded some privacy.' 73
In its conclusion the majority maintained that the deterrent effect
of the search condition would be "severely eroded if police officers
were required to learn the names and memorize the faces of the doz-
ens and perhaps hundreds of juvenile probationers in their jurisdic-
tion."'174 However, the majority fails to articulate exactly how the
deterrent effect of a search clause would be severely eroded. Instead,
the majority's simple conclusion is without analysis or explanation.
As the dissent notes, this position is insupportable,
[t]o the extent that a minor subject to a probationary search
condition is deterred from engaging in criminal activity because
of the fear of being searched by any police officer at any time,
such fear and deterrence will exist regardless of whether police
officers must "learn the names and memorize the faces" of juve-
nile probationers.'
75
Interestingly, the majority does concede that knowledge of a
search condition is not "undesirable," and that "advance knowledge
helps ensure that the resulting search is not conducted 'for reasons
unrelated to the rehabilitative and reformative purposes of probation
or other legitimate law enforcement purposes." 1 76 It is curious then
170. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622.
171. Id
172. TyrelI, 876 P.2d at 532.
173. The dissent's treatment of the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry is notable
in the sense that it does not discuss the issues in the context of Ciraolo to any degree.
Presumably it did not reach the argument on which the majority rested its opinion because,
in its view, Griffin controlled the case.
174. Tyrel, 876 P.2d at 530.
175. Id. at 537 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 530, (citing Bravo, 738 P.2d at 342).
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on what basis the majority relies. The majority does not "suggest that
[the officer] was harassing the minor merely because he lacked prob-
able cause to search him. Nor can [it] say on this record that the
search was arbitrary or capricious." '177
While the majority stated what was not the officer's purpose in
searching Tyrell, the majority never actually stated exactly what the
officer's purpose was. The officer certainly was not conducting the
search for the "rehabilitative and reformative purposes of probation,"
because the officer was completely unaware of the minor's probation-
ary status. Nor can the officer claim any "legitimate law enforcement
purpose," since an illegal search presumably does not constitute a "le-
gitimate law enforcement purpose."
The majority concludes with the suggestion that dispensing with
the "knowledge" requirement is "consistent with the primary purpose
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule."'178 Since the officer was
unaware of the search condition, he took a chance that the search was
improper and, therefore, that the fruits of that search would be subject
to the exclusionary rule. "Thus, under our interpretation, law en-
forcement officers still have a sufficient incentive to try to avoid im-
properly invading a person's privacy .... [O]ur reluctance to adopt a
strict 'knowledge-first' rule for juvenile probation search conditions
will not encourage police to engage in warrantless searches. 179
Quite to the contrary, however, introducing an element of chance
into the equation only will encourage police officers to gamble. In its
discussion of Binh, for example, the majority omits the fact that there
was a group of minors in the car. The officer searched all of them
twice before he was rewarded by the discovery of contraband on
Binh. 8 ' Thus it is not accurate to suggest that the only people af-
fected by an improper search are the ones on whom contraband is
discovered. This position ignores the dignity as well as the privacy
rights of other minors in the car. As the dissent correctly observed,
"[t]oday's holding offers police officers an incentive to search any ju-
venile despite the lack of probable cause and a warrant, for if it later
turns out that the juvenile has a probation search condition, the fruits
of the search will be admissible in court." ''
IV. Conclusion
The California Supreme Court opinion in In re Tyrell J. repre-
sents a "startling departure from settled principles underlying the
177. Id.
178. l at 531.
179. md at 531-32.
180. In re Binh L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
181. Tyrell, 876 P.2d at 537 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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Fourth Amendment .... ."182 The holding of Tyrell is insupportable
and is contrary to the principles articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin'83 and the precedent of the
California Supreme Court in People v. Bravo'" and In re Martinez.'85
The decision in Tyrell only will encourage fishing expeditions by
police officers and validate the "end justifies the means" type of law
enforcement which was expressly prohibited by the United States
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.'86 A search cannot be justified by
what it discovers. In making the assessment of constitutional reasona-
bleness "it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the be-
lief' that the action taken was appropriate?"'
87
The decision in In re Tyrell J. not only renders the Fourth
Amendment a nullity for many members of the population, it may be
the beginning of a trend that allows government agents to act first and
look for justification later. As Justice Jackson once observed, "[t]here
may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches
... of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which
no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we
never hear."'8 8 After the court's decision in Tyrell, there are sure to
be more.
182. AL at 532 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
183. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
184. 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987).
185. 463 P.2d 734 (Cal. 1970).
186. 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
187. Id
188. Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
